The summer sun burns the city, the air is steaming with heat waves, and the food delivery industry is hotter than the scorching heat. With the emergence of Alibaba’s blockbuster strategy of “50 billion subsidies”, the entire market trembled – this long-silent “takeaway three-legged” pattern has suddenly entered a white-hot decisive stage.
From “shallow taste” to “deep digging” assault battles
In the early morning of July 2, a striking red banner suddenly popped up on the homepage of the Taobao APP: “50 billion red envelopes have arrived, Ele.me is a carnival”. After clicking, users can directly receive a no-threshold coupon of “25 minus 21”, as well as activities such as “100,000 cups of milk tea per day for free” and “0 yuan grab for weekend meals”. This is not a small marketing – Alibaba officially announced that the 50 billion subsidy will cover the next 12 months (July 2025 to June 2026), and “no upper limit or gimmicks” will directly subsidize consumers and merchants in cash.
As soon as the news came out, social media instantly boiled. On Weibo, #饿了么满25减21#的话题在两小时内阅读量突破5亿, some users posted screenshots of the order of “3 cups of milk tea only cost 4 yuan”, and the comment area was full of messages such as “hurry up and gather wool” and “the reason for uninstalling Meituan has been found”. On Douyin, the video of “the takeaway brother is tired and paralyzed on the street” has become popular, and some riders said in the video: “From 7 a.m. to 2 a.m., the electric car has replaced 3 sets of batteries, and the legs are unstable, but today’s income can last for three days.” ”
Market data quickly confirmed the popularity of this carnival. On July 5, Ele.me’s single-day order volume rushed to 90 million, a sharp increase of 300% from the average daily order volume in June; Among the tea brands, Mixue Bingcheng shipped 180,000 cups in a single day, ancient tea exceeded 150,000 cups, and even Heytea, which has always taken the high-end route, sold 80,000 cups. What is more noteworthy is that these orders are not concentrated in first-tier cities – Zhoukou, Henan, Mianyang, Sichuan and other third- and fourth-tier cities account for more than 40%, indicating that Alibaba’s subsidies are rapidly penetrating the sinking market.
But this “raid” has long been foreshadowed. Back on April 29, Analysys, a third-party data agency, warned in the “2025 Food Delivery Industry Report”: “Alibaba’s investment in the food delivery field has been restrained, and its core advantages (Taobao’s 1 billion monthly active users, Alipay’s payment scenarios) have not yet been fully activated. At that time, Meituan’s market share was stable at 65%, Ele.me was about 28%, and JD.com was only 7%, and no one expected Alibaba to enter the market with an order of “50 billion”.
In fact, this is not the first time that the food delivery industry has been caught in a subsidy war. In 2019, Meituan and Ele.me staged a tug-of-war of “full 30 minus 15”, with an industry-wide subsidy of more than 80 billion yuan that year; When JD.com entered the game in 2022, it also smashed 20 billion subsidies, trying to break the situation with the combination of “next-day fresh + takeaway”. However, in contrast, Alibaba’s subsidy has three differences: first, the amount is larger (50 billion is equivalent to 2.5 times Meituan’s net profit in 2024); second, the scope is wider (covering all cities in the country, not key areas); and third, it is more synergistic (Taobao, Alipay, and Ele.me multi-terminal linkage).
In the face of Alibaba’s onslaught, Meituan’s response can be called “stress defense”. On July 3, Meituan urgently launched a “30 minus 25” superimposed coupon, and reduced the delivery fee from 3 yuan to 1 yuan; On July 6, it was announced that merchants would be exempted from commissions for three months in an attempt to prevent merchants from “defecting”. But the effect is not ideal – third-party monitoring shows that in the first 10 days of July, Meituan’s average daily orders dropped from 120 million to 98 million, and the daily income of riders in some areas fell by 20%, and the phenomenon of “yellow clothes to blue clothes” (Meituan riders changed to Ele.me equipment) began to appear.
This war has obviously gone beyond the level of “grabbing orders”. When Alibaba opened Taobao’s traffic floodgates to Ele.me, when Meituan sacrificed 3% of its profit margin to maintain its 65% market share, and when JD.com quietly shifted the budget of the food delivery team to short dramas and unmanned delivery – this is essentially a war about “traffic entrance control”, and food delivery is just a weapon for giants to compete for users’ time and attention.
Why are giants difficult to monopolize?
In the mobile phone industry, Apple can occupy the high-end market with the iOS ecosystem; In the field of new energy vehicles, BYD can win 30% of the share by relying on its supply chain advantages. But the food delivery industry is completely different – in the past ten years, no matter how much money the giants invest, no one has been able to achieve “one dominance”. Behind this is its unique “three noes” characteristic.
No resource barriers
The degree of fragmentation of China’s catering market is far beyond the imagination of the outside world. According to the “2025 China Catering Industry White Paper”, there are 16.8 million catering merchants in the country, of which 92% are small and medium-sized merchants with annual revenue of less than 500,000 yuan, and the market share of chain brands is only 18%. This decentralization makes it difficult for any platform to “catch it all”.
To achieve these three challenges, product managers will only continue to appreciate
Good product managers are very scarce, and product managers who understand users, business, and data are still in demand when they go out of the Internet. On the contrary, if you only do simple communication, inefficient execution, and shallow thinking, I am afraid that you will not be able to go through the torrent of the next 3-5 years.
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From the perspective of categories, the catering market is like a “kaleidoscope”: there are 500,000 hot pot restaurants, from Chongqing old hot pot to Chaoshan beef pot, the taste is very different; There are 600,000 tea shops, Mixue Bingcheng focuses on low prices, Heytea focuses on high-end, and ancient tea is deeply cultivated in the sinking market; There are 250,000 coffee shops, Luckin relies on parity to expand, Starbucks relies on scene experience, and Manner relies on the small store model. These merchants have different target customers and different needs for platforms – chain brands pay more attention to traffic exposure, mom-and-pop stores care more about commissions, and Internet celebrity stores need delivery speed to support word-of-mouth.
More importantly, the “metabolism” of the catering industry is surprisingly fast. According to the data, the average life expectancy of Chinese catering merchants is only 2.5 years, with 10,000 new stores opening every day and 8,000 old stores closing. This high-frequency replacement means that the platform must continue to “innovate”, otherwise it will face the loss of merchant resources. For example, the “Zibo Barbecue”, which will explode in 2024, will add 5,000 barbecue restaurants in just 3 months, and these merchants have settled in Ele.me, Meituan and JD.com almost at the same time.
The “multi-platform operation” of merchants has become the norm. Wang Lei, the owner of a spicy hot pot shop in Chaoyang, Beijing, told reporters: “I have opened stores in Meituan, Ele.me, and JD.com, and whichever platform has a high subsidy, I will put the main package on which platform.” Last week, Ele.me gave ’15 minus 20′, and I removed Meituan’s package from the shelves for 3 days, anyway, the switching cost is almost zero. This kind of “wallgrass” behavior makes it difficult for platforms to lock in resources through “exclusive cooperation” – even leading brands such as Starbucks and McDonald’s have never signed an exclusive agreement with a single platform.
This lack of resource barriers determines that the platform must always “please” merchants. Either reduce commissions (currently Meituan’s commission rate is about 18%, Ele.me is about 15%), or provide value-added services (such as Meituan’s “Store Pass” to help merchants do marketing, and Ele.me’s “cloud printer” is free), otherwise merchants may vote with their feet at any time.
There are no human barriers
The core capacity of the food delivery industry is riders, but this team of nearly 4 million people has never been the “private property” of any platform.
From the perspective of labor relations, 90% of riders are part-time or crowdsourced, and have no labor contract with the platform – they neither belong to Meituan nor Ele.me, but are more like “freelancers doing odd jobs”. This means that the rider’s sense of belonging is extremely low, and the only criterion for choosing a platform is “cost-effectiveness”: wherever platform has more orders, high unit price, and fast withdrawal, it will take orders.
When JD.com Takeaway was first launched in 2023, there was a “rider battle”. At that time, JD.com attracted Meituan riders to register with the condition of “increasing the commission by 2 yuan per order + guaranteed 600 yuan per week”, and even set up “changing points” on the street – as long as Meituan riders wear JD.com’s red overalls, they can receive 50 yuan in cash. In just one month, more than 100,000 riders “changed jobs”, resulting in Meituan’s delivery time extending from 30 minutes to 50 minutes in some areas.
Rider turnover is also affected by “single volume fluctuations”. During holidays, the number of orders on the platform surges, and riders will open multiple APPs at the same time to “grab orders”; In the off-season, if a platform launches a “rush prize” (such as completing 50 single prizes of 200 yuan), riders will pour in. This “where the money goes” makes it impossible for the platform to build barriers by “binding riders”.
More importantly, the cost structure of riders determines that it is difficult for the platform to “monopolize capacity”. The average monthly income of a full-time rider is about 8,000 yuan, including basic salary, commissions, subsidies, etc., while the hidden costs of social security and accident insurance borne by the platform are about 2,000 yuan/month. This means that if the platform wants to “raise riders”, it will cost at least 3-5 yuan more per order – an unbearable expense for a platform with an average of 10 million orders per day. Therefore, whether it is Meituan’s “special delivery + crowdsourcing” or Ele.me’s “hummingbird instant matching”, it is essentially an “asset-light” model, relying on social idle labor rather than building its own team.
This current situation without manpower barriers makes “transportation capacity” the most unstable variable. When Alibaba’s subsidies brought about a surge in orders, Ele.me was able to attract Meituan riders through “high-priced orders”; And when Meituan fights back, the riders will return. In the end, no platform can guarantee “exclusive capacity” and can only compete for temporary capacity tilt in the “price war”.
No user loyalty
The loyalty of food delivery users is probably the lowest of all internet services. According to the data, there are about 600 million food delivery users in China, of which 72% will use more than 2 platforms at the same time, and 35% will switch platforms once a week – their selection criteria are simple: who is cheaper, who is faster, and who has more coupons.
Alibaba’s subsidy of “full 25 minus 21” is to accurately hit the “profit-seeking psychology” of users. According to a third-party survey, in the first two weeks of July, 68% of Ele.me’s new users were from Meituan, and the average age of these users was between 25 and 35 years old – the group that is most sensitive to price and has the lowest switching cost. What’s even more interesting is that 40% of the users said that “if the subsidy stops, they may switch back to Meituan”, showing the essence of “no loyalty”.
The “disloyalty” of users is also reflected in “scenario-based choice”. Some people use Meituan on weekdays (because Meituan’s subsidy is more subsidized by the store downstairs of the company), and Ele.me on weekends (because the supermarket near home is fast in delivery); Some people order milk tea with Ele.me (there are many free orders), and Meituan is used for meals (more complete categories). This kind of “on-demand selection” behavior makes it difficult for the platform to retain users through the “membership system” or “points system” – after all, the 10 yuan membership fee is far less attractive than the “20 minus 15” membership.
Even “habits” are difficult to become barriers. In the past, Meituan cultivated user habits by “high-frequency use”, but when Ele.me embedded the entrance into Taobao (Chinese users open Taobao 3 times a day), users only need to click the “takeaway” icon to jump, and there is almost no learning cost. This “convenience of traffic entrance” can easily break the moat of “usage habits”.
For the platform, this means “never stop”. Once the subsidy decreases, users will be lost; Once delivery slows down, users switch to competing products. No company can rely on “brand loyalty” to settle down, and can only be exhausted in the cycle of “subsidy-order-re-subsidy”.
These “three noes” characteristics are superimposed to form the underlying logic of the food delivery industry: there are no resource barriers, so merchants can defect at any time; There are no manpower barriers, so the capacity can flow at any time; There is no user loyalty, so consumers can switch at any time. Ultimately, no giant can monopolize the market and can only maintain a dynamic balance in a continuous game – which is why the subsidy war repeats itself every few years, and it becomes more intense every few years.
Strategic differences between giants
When the smoke of 50 billion subsidies spreads, the response strategies of the three major players, Alibaba, Meituan, and JD.com, have long gone beyond the “takeaway itself”, but each has its own plans. Each of their moves points to different strategic goals: Alibaba wants “ecological synergy”, Meituan guards “basic market security”, and JD.com bets on “future technology”.
Alibaba’s existing traffic redistribution
Alibaba smashed 50 billion, not just for “takeaway orders” – its core goal is to activate Taobao’s “sleeping traffic” and reconstruct the ecological closed loop of local life. Taobao’s traffic advantage is Alibaba’s biggest trump card.
As the APP with the largest number of users in China (1 billion monthly active users), Taobao’s core scenario in the past was “physical e-commerce”, but users only spent 20 minutes on Taobao every day, far lower than Douyin’s 90 minutes. Alibaba’s abacus is: through the “high-frequency demand” of takeaway, users can stay on Taobao longer, from “buying clothes” to “ordering milk tea”, and then to “booking movie tickets”, forming a “one-stop consumption”.
In order to achieve this, Alibaba has made a three-layer linkage:
- The entrance is open: Taobao homepage has added a “Lightning Purchase” entrance, click to enter the takeaway interface, and users can directly reuse the delivery address and payment method on Taobao without re-filling it. According to the data, users who entered Ele.me through Taobao in July accounted for 73% of Ele.me’s new users, and the conversion rate (click-and-place order) reached 28%, far exceeding the industry average of 15%.
- Member Connectivity: Taobao 88VIP members automatically get an Ele.me Super Foodie Card, and can receive an additional “30 minus 10” exclusive coupon. This move directly leveraged 20 million 88 VIP users, and their unit price reached 45 yuan, which is 1.8 times that of ordinary users.
- Data sharing: Taobao’s user tags (such as “like hot pot” and “often buy maternal and child products”) are synchronized to Ele.me for accurate push. For example, “barbecue supper coupons” are promoted to users who “visit Taobao late at night”, and “children’s meals are fully discounted” are pushed to users who “buy baby milk powder”.
The power of this “ecological synergy” is particularly evident in the sinking market. In Shangqiu, Henan Province, after a user bought short sleeves on Taobao, a prompt popped up on the homepage saying “15 minus 12 for nearby milk tea shops”, and ordered a cup – this kind of “unintentional willow” order accounts for 35% in third- and fourth-tier cities, indicating that Alibaba is reaching those users who originally only ordered takeout at Meituan through the combination of “e-commerce + takeaway”.
Alibaba’s strategic rhythm is also very clear: first use the “nuclear bomb-level” subsidy of “full 25 minus 21” to quickly start the volume, and catch up with Meituan within 3 months (currently Meituan’s daily average of 120 million orders); then gradually reduce the subsidy and use the “membership system + ecological linkage” to retain users; The ultimate goal is to increase Ele.me’s daily active users from 30 million to 60 million, competing with Meituan’s 100 million daily active users.
But the risks of this strategy are also obvious: if the 50 billion subsidy cannot be converted into “retained users”, it will become a “waste of money”. Currently, Ele.me’s user repurchase rate (placing another order within 7 days) is only 35%, while Meituan’s is 58% – which means that once the subsidy stops, most users may lose.
Meituan’s maintenance efficiency moat
Meituan’s core anxiety is how to maintain a 65% market share under the premise of “not losing too much money”. As the “big brother” of the food delivery industry, Meituan’s advantages lie in “delivery efficiency” and “merchant density”, but its 3% profit margin makes it difficult to withstand the long-term subsidy war.
In order to defend, Meituan played a “combination punch”:
- Precise subsidies: There is no blind follow-up of “25 minus 21”, but coupons are issued for different users – “50 minus 20” (increase the unit price of customers) to high-frequency users (more than 5 times a week), “20 minus 15” to users at risk of churn (to prevent being snatched away by Ele.me), and “free delivery fee for the first order” to new users. This differentiation strategy makes Meituan’s subsidy cost 30% lower than that of Ele.me.
- Efficiency optimization: Meituan’s “super brain” scheduling system is its biggest confidence. The system can assign orders to the “best rider” based on rider location, real-time road conditions, and weather conditions, ensuring that 90% of orders are delivered within 30 minutes. During the heavy rains in July, Meituan’s delivery time in Beijing’s Chaoyang District was only extended by 5 minutes, while Ele.me was extended by 12 minutes – this “stability” has become the key to Meituan’s retention of users.
- Merchant binding: Launch a “commission return” for core merchants (such as McDonald’s and Starbucks): if the merchant’s Meituan orders account for more than 70%, a 3% commission will be returned. This move prevented the head brand from “defecting”, and Meituan’s chain brand orders still accounted for 28% in July, the same as in June.
But Meituan’s hidden worry lies in “profit pressure”. In 2024, Meituan’s net profit from takeaway will be about 20 billion, while the monthly subsidy in July will cost 5 billion – if this pace continues, the annual profit will be swallowed up. Therefore, Meituan is accelerating its “removal of takeaway dependence” and investing resources in community group buying (Meituan preferred) and instant retail (Meituan flash sale). According to the data, the daily orders of Meituan flash sale (supermarket fresh food arrives in 1 hour) have exceeded 30 million, accounting for 10% of total revenue from 10% to 18%, becoming a new growth pole.
For Meituan, the bottom line of this war is “not to lose 60% of the market share”. Once the market share falls below 60%, merchants may switch to Ele.me due to “insufficient orders”, forming a vicious circle. Therefore, even at the expense of short-term profits, Meituan must hold on to the fundamentals.
JD.com’s quality differentiated layout
Unlike the “frontal toughness” of Alibaba and Meituan, JD.com chose a “roundabout tactic” – temporarily withdrawing from the subsidy war, and instead laying out “quality takeaway” and “technical barriers”, trying to occupy the high-end market in the future “service stratification”.
JD.com’s “contraction” stems from a clear understanding of “performance costs”. Although the delivery experience is good (98% punctuality), the fulfillment cost is as high as 12 yuan per order, which is 3 times that of Meituan. This “asset-heavy” model is difficult to support the subsidy war, so JD.com quietly adjusted its strategy in July: suspending the “20 minus 15” large coupons, and instead launched a “quality selection” area, only retaining merchants with a unit price of more than 50 yuan (such as Meizhou Dongpo and Xibei), and focusing on “contactless delivery + tableware disinfection certification”.
At the same time, JD.com has invested resources in two new areas:
- Short drama drainage: The market size of short dramas is expected to reach 63.4 billion in 2025, with more than 400 million users, and a high degree of overlap with takeaway users (women aged 25-40 account for 60%). JD.com and Ningmeng Pictures launched a “takeaway-themed short drama”, in which the protagonist uses JD.com takeaway to order high-end ingredients, and the coupon of “100 minus 30 for the same style” pops up at the end of the film – the customer acquisition cost of this kind of “content implantation” is only 15 yuan/person, which is far lower than the 50 yuan/person of direct subsidies.
- Smart delivery: JD.com has piloted “unmanned vehicle distribution” in Suqian, Jiangsu Province and Dongguan, Guangdong, and 500 unmanned vehicles have been put into operation, which can cover orders within 3 kilometers, and the fulfillment cost is reduced to 3 yuan per order. JD.com’s goal is to let unmanned vehicles bear 30% of the distribution volume by 2026, completely solving the pain point of “high labor costs”.
JD.com’s strategic logic is not to participate in the price war with low gross profit, but to focus on users who are “insensitive to price” (such as white-collar workers and home users). These users are more concerned about “fresh ingredients”, “safe distribution” and “high-end categories”, and are willing to pay for premiums. According to the data, the unit price of JD.com’s “quality selection” zone reached 85 yuan, which was 2.5 times the industry average, and the repurchase rate reached 62%, far exceeding 40% of the industry.
Goldman Sachs’ forecast confirms JD.com’s potential: by 2026, the market size of instant retail (non-catering 1-hour delivery) will exceed 1 trillion, and JD.com may occupy 68% of the share with the supply chain advantages of “JD Daojia + Wal-Mart” – which means that even if takeaway orders are not as good as Alibaba and Meituan, JD.com can become a winner in the broader “instant retail” track.
JD.com’s choice is essentially to “avoid the red sea and look for the blue ocean”. When Alibaba and Meituan are fighting in the low-end market, JD.com is building a moat with “quality” and “technology”, waiting for the “industry reshuffle” after the end of the subsidy war.
Why are giants competing for the food delivery market?
When the 50 billion subsidy becomes a digital game, when riders and users repeatedly jump between platforms, we need to ask: the profit margin of the takeaway market is less than 5%, why can Alibaba, Meituan, and JD.com be so crazy? The answer is hidden in the three keywords of “traffic”, “data” and “ecology” – takeaway is no longer a business of “selling food”, but a strategic fortress for giants to compete for the “entrance to local life”.
High-frequency traffic ingress
The essence of the Internet is “the competition for user time”, and takeaway is “the most frequent rigid need”. According to the data, food delivery users open the APP an average of 2.3 times a day and stay for 8 minutes each time – this means that food delivery platforms can get 4.2 billion hours of attention from users every year, far exceeding e-commerce (2.8 billion hours) and short videos (3.5 billion hours).
This high frequency makes takeaway a “traffic amplifier”. For Alibaba, although there are many users on Taobao, “buying clothes” is a low-frequency behavior (an average of 3 times a month), while “ordering takeout” is a high-frequency behavior (2 times a day). By embedding high-frequency takeaway into Taobao, Alibaba can allow users to open Taobao more frequently, thereby driving low-frequency e-commerce consumption. For example, after ordering milk tea, users may go to Taobao to buy a T-shirt – this “high-frequency and low-frequency” effect has increased Taobao’s clothing orders by 12% in July.
For Meituan, takeaway is the “basic traffic plate”. Meituan’s logic is “high-frequency and low-frequency”: when users order takeaway every day, they will take a look at the “nearby movie tickets” and “pedicure packages”, which will drive the growth of in-store business (Meituan’s in-store wine and tourism). According to the data, 30% of Meituan’s takeaway users will use in-store business at the same time, and the ARPU (per capita consumption) of these users is three times that of pure takeaway users. Once the takeaway market share declines, the in-store business will also be impacted, which is also the core reason why Meituan must stick to takeaway.
Even JD.com has taken a fancy to the “traffic synergy” of takeaway. JD.com’s advantage lies in “3C home appliances” (low-frequency and high customer orders), and takeaway can bring JD.com exposure to “daily consumption scenarios”. For example, if a user orders fresh food on JD.com, he may see a recommendation that “it is more cost-effective with an oven” to buy home appliances – this “scene linkage” is increasing JD.com’s home appliance repurchase rate by 8%.
At a time when users’ attention is divided by content platforms such as Douyin and Kuaishou, the high-frequency scene of takeaway that “must be opened” has become the last “traffic fortress” of giants. Whoever can occupy this fortress will gain the initiative in the “user time war”.
Data goldmine
Takeaway data is the most precious “oil” in the Internet era. Each order contains information such as the user’s location, time, taste, and spending power, which can help the platform build a “360-degree user portrait” and then optimize other businesses.
For example, by analyzing food orders, the platform can know:
- A 28-year-old woman living in Chengdu orders salad every Wednesday night (probably losing weight), orders hot pot on weekends (likes to socialize), and has medium spending power (often uses coupons for 30 minus 15) – these data can be used to push advertisements for fitness classes and hot pot bases.
- A 35-year-old male in Tianfu Software Park, ordering a business meal of 25 yuan at noon every day and a barbecue with beer for 50 yuan in the evening – indicating that he is a programmer, working a lot of overtime, and can push cervical massagers and anti-blue light glasses.
Alibaba’s thirst for this data is particularly strong. Although Taobao has user shopping data, it lacks “local life” scene information (such as which restaurants users often go to and what flavors they like). Through Ele.me’s order, Alibaba can complete this part of the data and make the recommendation algorithm more accurate. For example, spicy hot pot bases are pushed to users who “often order Sichuan cuisine”, and fast food products are pushed to users who “order takeout late at night” – in July, Taobao’s conversion rate increased by 23% based on Ele.me’s data.
Meituan optimizes the “in-store business” through takeaway data. For example, if a user is found to often order “Starbucks takeaway”, he will push a coupon of “60 minus 15 for consumption in the store”; Seeing that users order “hot pot takeaway”, they recommend a set meal at a nearby hot pot restaurant. This transformation of “online and offline” has reduced the customer acquisition cost of Meituan’s in-store business by 15%.
More importantly, this data can be used for the construction of the “credit system”. Alipay’s sesame credit score has included “on-time payment for takeaway” and “no malicious cancellation of orders” into the scoring dimension; Meituan’s “trust score” affects the rider’s order priority. In the future, takeaway data may even be linked to credit reporting and become a reference for assessing personal credit.
For giants, the value of takeaway data far exceeds the “takeaway itself” – it is a “microscope” to understand the real needs of users and a “navigator” to optimize the business of the whole platform.
Ecological synergy
The ultimate battlefield of takeaway is “the dominance of the local life ecology”. When the user’s “eating” needs are met, the platform will try to cover all local needs such as “travel”, “entertainment” and “health” and become the “operating system for urban life”.
Alibaba has the greatest ecological ambitions. Its layout is the whole chain of “Taobao (e-commerce) + Ele.me (takeaway) + AutoNavi (map) + Fliggy (travel) + Alipay (payment)”: when users navigate with AutoNavi, they will receive takeaway coupons from nearby restaurants; After booking a hotel in Fliggy, it will push food packages around the hotel; When paying with Alipay, the takeaway red envelope will be automatically deducted. This kind of “scene interconnection” makes Alibaba’s local life ecology form a closed loop, and it is difficult for users to escape.
For example, a user’s behavior chain may be: Fliggy books a plane ticket→ AutoNavi navigates to the airport→ Ele.me orders airport meals→ Alipay pays→ Taobao buys travel souvenirs. In this chain, takeaway is the “glue”, connecting various scenes in series. July data shows that users who have used Ele.me have increased the frequency of using Amap by 18%, and Fliggy’s order volume has increased by 15%, confirming the effect of ecological synergy.
Meituan’s ecology is more “local”: takeaway (eating) + Meituan taxi (travel) + Dianping (to the store) + Meituan grocery shopping (fresh). Its logic is to “build a 3-kilometer living circle around the user’s place of residence and work”. For example, when users order takeout, they will see Meituan flash sale coupons of “50 minus 20 for 50 in the supermarket downstairs”; When taking a taxi, the driver may recommend “10 yuan off for new customers of milk tea shops on the way”. This “small and dense” ecology has a very high penetration rate in first- and second-tier cities.
JD.com’s ecology takes the “quality route”: JD Mall (genuine) + JD Daojia (instant retail) + JD Health (medicine) + JD Finance (payment). Its target users are the “quality-sensitive” middle class, for example: users buy high-end ingredients on JD.com, and JD.com Daojia will push the service of “chef’s door-to-door cooking”; If you buy cold medicine at JD Health, you will recommend the takeaway of “light porridge”.
The competition in these ecosystems is essentially a competition for the “right to set standards” – who can define the service standards of local life (such as delivery timeliness, merchant access, user rights), and who can let other players “play according to their own rules”. For example, Meituan’s “on-time delivery” standard (overtime compensation of 10 yuan) has become the default rule in the industry; The “food safety traceability of merchants” promoted by Alibaba is affecting the formulation of regulatory policies.
When the giants’ ecological coverage is wide enough, takeaway is no longer an “independent business”, but an ecological “infrastructure” – just like the “notepad” in the Windows system, although it does not make money itself, it can drive the use of the entire system.
How long can the subsidy war last?
When consumers cheer for “4 yuan to drink 3 cups of milk tea”, merchants are worried about “selling a single and losing 5 yuan”; When the platform celebrates the “daily order exceeding 100 million”, the loss on the financial statement is expanding; When riders are excited about “1,000 yuan a day”, the red line of the policy has been quietly tightened. Behind this subsidy carnival, there are three hidden worries that are difficult to ignore, which are destined not to last long.
Merchant dilemma
For catering merchants, the subsidy war is a “sweet poison” – while orders are skyrocketing, profits are being eaten up.
Small and medium-sized businesses have a particularly difficult time. The owner of a Malatang shop in Haidian District, Beijing, calculated an account: after participating in Ele.me’s “25 minus 21”, the user paid 4 yuan, the platform commission was 15% (about 0.6 yuan), and the merchant actually received 3.4 yuan. But the cost of this order includes: 12 yuan for ingredients, 1 yuan for packaging boxes, and 0.5 yuan for water and electricity, a total of 13.5 yuan – a loss of 10.1 yuan for each order sold. “The daily order has risen from 50 to 300, which looks lively, but the loss of 3,000 yuan a day cannot last a month.” The boss said helplessly.
Although chain brands have scale advantages, they cannot escape pressure. The regional manager of a leading tea brand revealed: “The cost of our milk tea is 30% of the selling price, and after participating in the ‘full 25 minus 21’, the profit per cup has changed from 7 yuan to -3 yuan.” In order to stop the loss, the material package can only be quietly reduced (for example, the pearl is reduced from 50g to 30g), but users have begun to complain about the ‘taste has become weaker’. “What’s even more troublesome is that chain brands have a national unified price, and they cannot “quietly increase prices” like small and medium-sized merchants, so they can only bear losses.
The “dilemma” of merchants is: if they do not participate in subsidies, the order volume will plummet (after a merchant withdrew from the Ele.me subsidy, orders fell by 80%); Participating in subsidies, losses expanded. In the end, they can only hope that “the subsidy will end as soon as possible”, but this will lead to a decline in orders – this “vicious circle” is overdrawing the health of the entire catering industry.
The longer-term harm is that “bad money drives out good money”. When subsidies become the norm, businesses that do quality with heart will be eliminated due to high costs, while those who cut corners and lower standards can survive. In the long run, the overall quality of the catering industry will decline, which will ultimately harm the interests of consumers.
Policy risk
The state’s “sword of Damocles” supervision of “low-price involution” is constantly tightening, and the subsidy war may touch the policy red line at any time.
In March 2025, the National Development and Reform Commission issued the “Guiding Opinions on Regulating the Competition Order of the Platform Economy”, which clearly pointed out that “unfair competition through subsidies is prohibited to prevent the disorderly expansion of capital”; In June, the State Administration for Market Regulation issued 3 fines of 100 million yuan for “low-price dumping” on community group buying platforms; In July, the Ministry of Commerce held a “food delivery industry symposium”, requiring the platform to “reasonably determine the subsidy intensity and protect the rights and interests of merchants and riders”.
These signals show that regulators’ tolerance for “subsidy wars” is decreasing. From a legal point of view, Article 12 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law stipulates that “operators shall not use the advantages of data, algorithms, technology, etc. to engage in unfair competition” – if the platform’s subsidies lead to “crowding out competitors and harming the long-term interests of consumers”, it may be recognized as “unfair competition”.
Historical experience is also worthy of vigilance. In 2021, the community group buying platform was forced to stop low-price subsidies due to “1 cent grabbing vegetables”, and the industry entered a period of regulation; In 2023, the “low-price subsidy” of ride-hailing platforms will be required to be rectified, and the subsidy shall not exceed 10% of the cost. If the food delivery industry continues to “lose money and make money”, it is likely to usher in similar regulatory intervention.
More importantly, the subsidy war will cause “employment problems”. When platforms squeeze riders (such as reducing unit prices and extending delivery times) or force merchants to cut wages (due to declining profits) in order to reduce costs, it may cause social conflicts. In July, some riders complained to the trade union that “Ele.me is forced to run 12 hours a day, otherwise no subsidies will be issued”.
For platforms, policy risks are the “sword of Damocles” hanging over their heads – the stronger the subsidy and the longer it lasts, the higher the possibility of regulatory intervention.
Sustainability
Whether from the perspective of financial data or historical laws, the “50 billion subsidy” is destined to be a short-term behavior – no company can afford this level of loss for a long time.
Although Alibaba’s cash flow is abundant (about 200 billion in cash reserves in 2024), the 50 billion subsidy is equivalent to 15% of its annual net profit, and this is just the “beginning” – if Meituan continues to fight back, Alibaba may need to invest more. More importantly, Alibaba’s core business (e-commerce) is facing the impact of Douyin, and Taobao’s growth rate has dropped to 8% in 2024.
Meituan is under more pressure. Its net profit in 2024 will be 20 billion, while the monthly subsidy in July will be 5 billion, and if this intensity is maintained throughout the year, the net profit will become -40 billion. Meituan’s response is to “open source and reduce expenditure”: on the one hand, it increases the income of non-takeaway business (such as in-store wine and tourism, flash sales), and on the other hand, it reduces rider subsidies (the unit price of riders dropped from 8 yuan to 7.2 yuan in July). However, this model of “tearing down the east wall to make up for the west wall” is difficult to sustain for a long time.
JD.com’s “shrinkage” is essentially a sober understanding of the “money-burning model”. Its CEO Xu Lei said in an internal letter: “We will not participate in the endless subsidy war, and we will use resources on technology and services.” “This option will lose short-term orders, but it will avoid a cash flow crisis.
From the perspective of industry law, the “endgame” of the subsidy war must be “the survival of a few players”. In the 2015 taxi war, Didi and Kuaidi finally merged; In the 2019 bike-sharing war, only Meituan and Hello remained. Although the food delivery industry is difficult to monopolize, continuous burning of money will eliminate players with “weak financial strength”, and eventually form a stable pattern of “duopoly” or “Big Three”.
For the entire industry, it is only a matter of time before the subsidy war ends. When the enthusiasm of capital fades, the food delivery industry will eventually return to the normal of “reasonable profits” – and before that, all players are “better than who can hold on to the end”.
Service tiering is the trend
The subsidy war will eventually come to an end, and when “price” is no longer the only dimension of competition, the food delivery industry will enter a new stage of “service stratification”. Different platforms will target different customer groups and provide differentiated services according to their own advantages, and finally form a market pattern of “high-end quality, mid-end cost-effective, and low-end guaranteed”.
High-end market
The high-end market is to pay for “efficiency and quality”, and the customer base of this market is high-income people (monthly income of more than 20,000 yuan), white-collar workers and family users, whose core needs are “fast, good, and safe” and are not sensitive to price.
Meituan is likely to dominate the high-end market. Its advantages lie in “distribution efficiency” and “merchant quality”:
- Express service: For orders within 3 kilometers, “20 minutes must arrive”, 50% of the order amount will be compensated for overtime, but the delivery fee will be increased from 3 yuan to 8 yuan. This service has been piloted in densely populated areas of office buildings, with a unit price of 60 yuan and a user repurchase rate of 72%.
- Quality Alliance: Screen the merchants of “kitchen live broadcast”, “ingredient traceability” and “chef certification” to form a “quality alliance”, and the platform charges a commission of 25% (higher than 18% of ordinary merchants), but provides traffic tilt (high search ranking). At present, 2,000 brands such as Meizhou Dongpo and Pizza Hut have joined, accounting for 15% of the orders.
JD.com may focus on “high-end ingredients and scenario-based services”:
- Private kitchen takeaway: Cooperate with five-star hotel chefs to launch the “door-to-door cooking + tableware recycling” service, users can order the “Boston Lobster Package” (including chef’s door-to-door processing), and the unit price of customers reaches more than 500 yuan.
- Smart insulation: Using an incubator with GPS and temperature control, users can check the temperature of the meal in real time (e.g. steak needs to be kept at 65°C) to ensure taste. This service has been piloted in Lujiazui, Shanghai, and most of the users are financial practitioners.
The profit margin of the high-end market can reach 15%, which is 3 times that of ordinary takeaway, and the user loyalty is high (it is difficult to switch once you get used to it). In the future, the scale of this market may reach 200 billion, becoming the “profit cow” of the platform.
Mid-market
The terminal market is a balanced relationship between cost performance and experience, which covers most users (monthly income of 5,000-20,000), who want both “discounts” and “experience”, and are the main customer group of the platform.
Alibaba may have an advantage in the mid-range market. Its strategy is the synergy of “e-commerce + takeaway”, providing “cost-effective packages”:
- Combination offer: After ordering takeaway, users can receive Taobao’s “related gift certificates” (if they order hot pot, send hot pot base 50 minus 20 coupons), and reduce the pressure of takeaway subsidies through “takeaway drainage and e-commerce monetization”.
- Regional operation: According to the taste preferences of different cities, customized packages (such as Chengdu launches “spicy package 40 minus 15”, Guangzhou pushes “sugar water minus 10 for 30”) to improve user matching.
The key to the mid-range market is “cost control”. The platform will reduce performance costs through “intelligent scheduling” (reducing riders driving empty), “reservation orders” (users order in advance, merchants produce at staggered peaks), and “centralized distribution” (consolidated distribution of orders in the same office building), so as to find a balance between “price” and “experience”. This market is expected to account for 60% of the overall share and is the “basic market” of the platform.
sinking market
The customer base in the sinking market (third- and fourth-tier cities and townships) is price-sensitive, and the core demand is “cheap and deliverable”, and the unit price of customers is mostly less than 20 yuan.
This market may be covered by Alibaba and Meituan, but with different strategies:
- Alibaba will use Taobao’s sinking traffic to launch a “low-price area” (such as a “10 yuan full” package), and cooperate with local snack bars (such as Malatang in the county and fried chicken restaurants in townships) to attract settlers through “low commission + traffic support”.
- Meituan will optimize the “crowdsourcing capacity” and use “motorcycle drivers and convenience store clerks” in townships as part-time riders to reduce delivery costs and ensure that “5 yuan delivery fee can be delivered to the village”.
The potential of the sinking market is huge – its takeaway penetration rate is currently only 15%, far lower than the 45% of first-tier cities, and the user growth rate is twice that of first-tier cities. In the future, with the development of the county economy, this market will become the fastest growing sector.
Technology-driven: unmanned distribution reconstructs industry costs
Regardless of the market segment, technology will become the “core competitiveness”. Among them, the popularization of unmanned distribution (drones, unmanned vehicles) may completely change the cost structure of the industry.
JD.com has the deepest layout in this field. Its unmanned vehicles have achieved “village-to-village communication” in Suqian, Jiangsu Province, which can reduce the distribution cost within 3 kilometers from 8 yuan to 3 yuan; The drone piloted “cross-river distribution” in Dongguan, Guangdong, which solved the problem of “slow distribution caused by river blockage”, and the cost of a single delivery was reduced from 15 yuan to 5 yuan. JD.com’s goal is to let unmanned delivery take on 50% of orders by 2027.
Meituan is also testing the combination of “intelligent scheduling + unmanned vehicles”: using algorithms to predict order peaks, deploying unmanned vehicles downstairs in the office building in advance, and after the user places an order, the rider only needs to pick up the food from the merchant and put it on the unmanned vehicle, and then the unmanned vehicle completes the last 1 kilometer of delivery. This mode can increase rider efficiency by 30% and reduce costs by 20%.
The ultimate goal of technology is to “de-dependence on manpower”. When the cost of unmanned delivery is lower than that of manpower, the profit margin of takeaway will rise from 5% to 15%, and the industry will completely bid farewell to the “money-burning model” and enter a new stage of healthy development.
Involution is not the way out, innovation is
When the smoke of 50 billion subsidies dissipates, we will find that the ultimate competition in the food delivery industry is never “who subsidizes more”, but “who can solve the real problems of the industry”.
For users, the real question is not “how much to reduce today”, but “whether it can be delivered on time, whether the ingredients are clean, and whether special needs (such as less spicy, separate packing) can be met”; For merchants, the real question is not “how much traffic the platform gives”, but “whether it can reduce customer acquisition costs, increase repurchase rates, and achieve sustainable profitability”; For riders, the real question is not “how much money you earn today”, but “whether you can have a stable income, reasonable rest, and professional dignity”.
Only those platforms that can solve these problems can truly win the market. Perhaps Meituan uses algorithms to optimize riders’ routes so that they can run less unjustly; Perhaps JD.com uses unmanned distribution to reduce costs, so that merchants have more profit margins; Perhaps Alibaba uses ecological collaboration to make users’ consumption experience smoother – but either way, the core is “innovation”, not “involution”.
Subsidies will eventually ebb and the price war will eventually end, but users’ demand for “convenience, efficiency and quality” will always exist. The next chapter of the takeaway world will no longer be a “carnival of burning money”, but “value creation” – who can create real value will have the last laugh.
