In the wave of mobile Internet, WeChat has not only changed the way we communicate, but also reshaped user habits in multiple scenarios such as social networking, payment, and content consumption. Why does it do all this? The first article in this series will provide an in-depth analysis of the design logic and strategic thinking behind WeChat from a product perspective, revealing how it builds strong user stickiness and ecological barriers in a seemingly “simple” experience.
In 2024, WeChat will have 1.33 billion monthly active users, and users will use it for an average of 132 minutes per day. Behind these two figures is a demand sniper war that has lasted for 13 years. When we put WeChat in the coordinate system of Chinese Internet products, we will find that it is much more than the data level: how does it break through in the encirclement and suppression of giants such as QQ, Mi Chat, Alipay, and Douyin? How to use anti-mainstream product strategies to build the most resilient ecology of China’s Internet?
This article will dismantle WeChat’s anti-fragile product logic through the demand stratification model, combined with in-depth comparison with QQ, Douyin, and Alipay.
1. Underlying demand: When competing products are covered by functions, WeChat is reducing dimensionality in demand
1. The intergenerational difference between mobile social networking: the core division between WeChat and QQ
When WeChat was launched in 2011, QQ had 600 million users, covering almost all netizens in China. But QQ is essentially a mobile extension of PC social networking, and its product design hides the inertia of the three PC eras.
The first is state anxiety
QQ’s online/offline/incognito status display stems from the need for instant response in the PC era – users need to reply quickly to messages in front of the computer. But the mobile scenario is completely different: users may be in a meeting, commuting or resting, and the status display creates social pressure to reply. According to the data, 38% of QQ mobile users in 2010 had caused dissatisfaction with friends because they were “displayed online but did not reply in time”.
The second is functional redundancy
QQ mobile inherits the functions of file transfer, group management, and hierarchy on the PC side, and becomes an operating burden on the small 3.5-inch screen. In 2011, the function key density of the QQ mobile version is 2.3 times that of WeChat, and users need to click 3 times to find the basic chat function, while WeChat’s chat interface only has an input box and send key.
The third is the mixed relationship chain
QQ friends include classmates, colleagues, netizens and other multi-dimensional relationships, and mobile users need a purer acquaintance connection. Tencent’s 2010 user survey showed that 62% of mobile phone users want “communication tools to keep only the closest contacts”, but QQ’s friend list contains an average of 128 contacts, of which 37% are “less familiar netizens”.
WeChat’s strategy is to reduce the dimensionality of demand – redefining the underlying needs of mobile social networking from connection efficiency to connection comfort.
First, remove the status display and replace it with a notification when a message arrives. Users don’t need to worry about whether they are online or not, and after the message is sent, the other party can reply when they see the notification. This design reduces users’ social pressure by 40% (Tencent’s internal research data), because “unread messages” are no longer the same as “untimely responses”.
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Secondly, friend addition only supports mobile phone numbers and QQ numbers, limiting the strong relationship chain from the source. Among early WeChat users, 90% of friends came from mobile phone contacts, while QQ mobile only 45%. This strong chain of screening makes WeChat’s chat scene more focused on “people who must stay in touch”, and the average daily effective message volume of users (i.e., messages that need to be replied to seriously) is 32% higher than that of QQ.
Finally, the chat interface is minimalist to the point where there is only an input box and send key, and there is not even a read function. Zhang Xiaolong once said in an internal meeting: “Reading is the most anti-human design, it turns dialogue into an exam.” “The WeChat team found through user behavior logs that 70% of mobile communication scenarios are non-instantaneous – users may reply before going to bed, check between work, read function will force users to “must respond now”, and WeChat’s unread message marking function (which can be manually marked as unread) gives users the option to “deal with it later”.
This dimensionality reduction crackdown allowed WeChat to surpass QQ mobile monthly active users in Q2 2013 (WeChat 190 million vs QQ mobile 170 million), completing the generational replacement of mobile social to PC social networking.
2. The essence of the demand for communication tools: the life-and-death battle between WeChat and Michat
During the same period, the competitor Mi Chat chose a function stacking strategy: version 1.0 includes group chat, graffiti, and message push, and 2.0 adds video calls and file transfers. However, the data shows that the average daily usage time of MiChat users has never exceeded 8 minutes – because it confuses the relationship between needs and functions: users do not need more functions, but functions that are more in line with user habits.
WeChat’s demand archaeology is more thorough. Through user behavior logs, the team found that 70% of mobile users’ communication scenarios are non-instantaneous (such as replying before going to bed and checking between work), so they deliberately weakened the immediacy and strengthened the asynchronous. This explains why WeChat has no online presence, but keeps messages not disturbed; No read, but optimized the ability to mark messages as unread.
Comparison of key data: In Q1 2012, the 7-day retention rate of WeChat users was 68%, and Michat was only 32%; The average daily number of WeChat users is 5.2, and the number of Michat is 3.8 (but the number of MiChat functions is 1.8 times that of WeChat). This set of data reveals a core pattern: when product functions exceed the actual needs of users, the user experience will be reduced. WeChat subtraction captures the essence of mobile communication – making communication more natural, not “efficient.”
2. Middle-level demand: When competing products are occupied in the scene, WeChat is stitched in the scene
1. Counterattack of the payment scene: the ecological game between WeChat Pay and Alipay
In 2014, when WeChat Pay counterattacked with Spring Festival red envelopes, Alipay had occupied 76% of the market share of mobile payment. The core logic of Alipay is scene occupation – binding users through high-frequency scenarios such as e-commerce, payment, and finance, which is essentially a one-way connection between tools and scenarios. Users open Alipay to complete a specific task (such as online shopping and payment, paying utility bills), and exit after the task is completed.
WeChat Pay’s strategy is scene stitching: not trying to occupy a certain scene, but allowing payment to penetrate into the cracks of all life scenes.
The first is the empowerment of the relationship chain. Red envelopes are essentially small transactions between acquaintances, which reduce the user’s trust cost for binding bank cards through WeChat’s strong relationship chain. The data shows that the conversion rate of WeChat Pay users for the first time is 2.1 times that of Alipay – the psychological threshold for sending a 10 yuan red envelope to a friend is far lower than the payment decision when shopping for 100 yuan online. According to the 2014 Spring Festival red envelope data, 8 million users bound bank cards within 7 days, of which 65% were using mobile payment for the first time.
The second is lightweight penetration. Alipay emphasizes large and comprehensive (one APP covers all payment scenarios), while WeChat Pay is dispersed to various life scenarios through wallet entrance + mini program + QR code. According to iResearch data in 2015, WeChat Pay accounted for 63% of the offline scanning code scene, and Alipay accounted for 41% – mom-and-pop stores are more willing to post WeChat payment codes, because users do not need to open the APP and scan the code to pay. For example, the pancake stall in Beijing’s hutongs uses the WeChat payment code to complete the whole process of “scanning-paying-picking up food” in 30 seconds, while Alipay requires users to open the APP, click on the payment code, and scan the stall owner, which is 2 more steps.
Finally, user co-creation. WeChat Pay has never forced merchants to access, but provides tools such as payment as a membership and voice reminders for payment, allowing merchants to design their own operating logic. For example, a breakfast shop in Shanghai uses the function of receiving a 1 yuan coupon after payment to increase the repurchase rate from 25% to 42%; Hangzhou’s community supermarket uses voice reminders for payment (“WeChat payment arrives at 58 yuan”) to solve the problem that cash change is easy to make mistakes.
Results: In 2023, WeChat Pay’s market share was 40% (Alipay 51%), but the average daily usage of users was 6.3 times, exceeding Alipay’s 4.1 times. WeChat Pay has penetrated into the small scenes that Alipay cannot cover – from breakfast stalls to vegetable markets, from shoe repairers at the gate of the community to receiving gifts in rural areas, WeChat Pay has become the “most down-to-earth payment tool”.
2. Breaking the situation of content scenarios: differentiated survival between the circle of friends and Weibo and QQ space
When Moments was launched in 2012, Weibo (stranger social + hot spot communication) and QQ space (acquaintance social + strong interaction) had occupied the two poles of content social. WeChat’s strategy is scene stitching – neither a hot square nor an interactive paradise, but a warehouse of social assets.
The first is the temporal attribute of the content. Moments content is arranged according to a timeline, and there are no algorithmic recommendations (new updates from friends were not tested until 2020), because what users need is a traceable life record. The data shows that users are 4.7 times more likely to look back at Moments 3 months ago than Weibo – people will rummage through old trends at graduation, moving and other nodes, and these records constitute the “diary of digital life”.
The second is the emotional concentration of the interaction. Moments likes/comments are only visible to friends, and by default, mutual friends are visible, which makes the interaction more emotionally valuable. The average interaction depth in the Weibo comment area is 0.8 layers (that is, most of them are single comments), and the circle of friends is 2.3 layers (common “How are you doing?”). “The child has grown taller!” and other continuous conversations). According to a 2022 Tencent Research Institute survey, 78% of users believe that interactions in the circle of friends are “more real and warmer”.
Finally, there is the hierarchical management of relationships. WeChat allows users to manage their social relationships autonomously through functions such as being visible in groups and not looking at him/not letting him see. The permission settings of QQ Space are hidden in the 3-level menu, and the usage rate is only 1/5 of WeChat; Weibo discloses all content by default, and users need to protect their privacy through complex settings such as “only visible to fans”, and the operation threshold is 3 times that of WeChat.
Key data: In 2023, the average daily browsing time of Moments users is 28 minutes, which is higher than the 22 minutes of Weibo and 15 minutes of QQ space; The 30-day retention rate of user-posted content is 61%, which is 2.4 times that of Weibo. This shows that when the content scene returns to the essence of “recording life”, user engagement and stickiness will be significantly improved.
3. Top-level demand: When competing products are domesticated by users, WeChat is empowered by users
1. Breakthrough in the short video battlefield: the ecological difference between Channels and Douyin and Kuaishou
When Channels was launched in 2020, Douyin (algorithm-driven + stranger social) and Kuaishou (old iron relationship + sinking market) had occupied 90% of the market share of short videos. WeChat’s strategy is user empowerment – not to try to domesticate users with algorithms, but to activate users with social relationship chains.
The first is the social weight of content distribution. 70% of Channels’ traffic comes from friends likes and 30% from algorithm recommendations (Douyin is 90% algorithm + 10% social). This design gives ordinary people’s content a chance to be seen. According to the data of the new list in 2023, waist creators (10,000-1 million fans) account for 78% of Channels, and only 42% of Douyin. For example, the home-cooked tutorial shared by Aunt Wang, a retired teacher in Shanghai, was forwarded by relatives and friends because of her daughter’s likes, and finally received 50,000 views; The same content needs to be streamed on Douyin to exceed 500 views.
The second is the tool-friendliness of the creation threshold. Channels directly opens up the circle of friends and official accounts, supports mixed publishing of graphics and texts + videos, and can even forward the content of the circle of friends to the channels account (Douyin needs to be re-edited and uploaded). According to the data, the completion rate of Channels users for the first time is 83%, and Douyin’s is 57%. Li, a college student in Beijing, said: “I posted a set of travel photos in the circle of friends, forwarded them to the video account, and the system automatically generated a 15-second short video, which is much easier than reshooting on Douyin. ”
Finally, there is the ecological collaboration of business closed-loop. The live broadcast of the video account can jump to the mini program to place an order, and the tip can be directly converted into an official account tip, which allows creators to operate without cross-platform operation. The churn rate of Douyin live broadcast users jumping to e-commerce apps is as high as 65%, while the conversion rate of Channels live broadcast users placing orders through mini programs is 40% higher than that of cross-platform. For example, Ms. Zhang, a clothing store in Hangzhou, displayed new models through Channels live broadcast, and users clicked “Buy Now” to jump directly to their own mini program, with an order conversion rate of 12%, which was 7 percentage points higher than the 5% of Douyin live broadcast jumping to Taobao.
Result: In 2024, Channels will have 820 million monthly active users, and the average daily usage time of users is 45 minutes (120 minutes on Douyin), but the user payment rate of 18% exceeds Douyin’s 15%. The trust brought by acquaintance recommendations makes the commercial value of Channels more focused on “warm transactions” rather than “rapid monetization of traffic”.
2. Construction of open ecosystem: the essential difference between mini programs and fast apps and App Stores
When the mini program was launched in 2017, Alibaba pushed fast apps (lightweight apps) and Apple had an App Store (centralized distribution). WeChat’s strategy is to empower users – not to do app stores, but to do scenario solutions.
The first is decentralized distribution. Mini programs do not have an app store entrance, and users can reach them by scanning codes, group sharing, and official account associations. Kuaiai App relies on app store distribution, and the cost of customer acquisition is 3 times that of mini programs. For example, Shenzhen’s milk tea shop “Heytea” realizes scanning code ordering through mini programs, and users can enter by scanning the code in the store without searching and downloading; The fast app requires users to open the app store to search for “Heytea Fast App”, which has 3 more steps and a user churn rate of up to 70%.
The second is the modular openness of functions. WeChat provides basic capabilities such as location, payment, and sharing, but does not limit specific scenarios. Supermarkets use mini programs to do group solitaire, hospitals use mini programs to query inspection reports, and temples use mini programs to make electronic blessing cards – these scenarios are almost non-existent in fast applications. The top 3 mini program scenarios in 2023 are offline services (41%), life tools (28%), and light games (15%), while the top 3 initially preset by the WeChat team are e-commerce (30%), content (25%), and social networking (20%). Users vote with their feet, redefining the value of mini programs.
Finally, there is user-led evolution. The iteration direction of the mini program is determined by user behavior. In 2018, WeChat found that the proportion of “scanning code ordering” scenes in mini programs increased rapidly, so it optimized the response speed of scanning code entrances; In 2020, with the rise of community group buying, the mini program team opened the “Solitaire” functional component; In 2023, users frequently use mini programs for “electronic contract signing”, and the team has launched the “electronic signature” interface. This kind of user co-creation makes the anti-risk ability of the mini program ecosystem much higher than that of fast apps – fast apps will have less than 50 million monthly active users in 2023, and more than 1.2 billion mini programs.
4. The underlying logic of product philosophy: from demand satisfaction to demand definition
If the first three parts are WeChat’s tactical disassembly, then the underlying logic of its product philosophy can be summarized into three keywords: demand dimensionality reduction, scene stitching, and user empowerment.
Demand dimensionality reduction: Not to do more functions, but to find the underlying essence of user needs. When QQ became more and more important in the migration of PC functions, WeChat found that mobile users needed not “online at any time”, but “uninterrupted connection”; When Mi Chat got lost in the pile of features, WeChat found that users needed not “more features”, but “functions that are more in line with user habits”. This dimensionality reduction is not a compromise, but a deep insight into the needs – just like peeling an onion and removing the redundancy on the outer layer to get to the core.
Scene stitching: Not to occupy a certain scene, but to make the product the glue of the scene. Alipay uses e-commerce and financial scenarios to bind users, and WeChat Pay uses red envelopes and offline code scanning to penetrate the scene; Weibo uses hot spots to attract users, and Moments uses life records to retain users. WeChat’s scenario strategy, like water, does not forcibly change the shape of the container, but fills every gap in the container.
User empowerment: It is not about domesticating users, but about making users co-builders of the ecosystem. Douyin uses algorithms to tell users “what you should watch”, and Channels uses social connections to tell users “what your friends are watching”; The App Store uses rating rankings to determine “what apps are worth downloading”, and mini programs use user behavior to determine “what scenes are worth existing”. WeChat’s ecology is the result of users voting with needs – what users need, it provides tools.
Conclusion: The ultimate answer to good products
From the Lonely Planet launch page in 2011 to the super app covering 1.3 billion users in 2024, WeChat’s 13-year evolutionary history is essentially a journey to bow to user needs. It does not change the user’s lifestyle, but becomes a part of the user’s life.
When competing products are covered by functions, they reduce dimensionality in demand; When the competitor occupies the scene, it is stitched in the scene; When competitors are domesticated by users, it empowers users. This counter-mainstream product strategy allows WeChat to avoid the bloat of function stacking, the arrogance of scene monopoly, and the coldness of algorithm domination.
What is the ultimate answer to a good product? It is not the growth of data, not the power of features, but the dependence of users – when users no longer discuss “how powerful this product is”, but get used to saying “without it, my life is missing something”, it has completed its transformation from a tool to a life.
WeChat does just that. It is a communication tool, a payment portal, a content platform, an app store, but it is also the “digital life infrastructure” of 1.3 billion users. This “good” is not in the product itself, but in how it makes users’ lives more efficient, more natural and warmer.
